Commentaries On The 9/11 Commission Report
By Christopher Effgen
The Disaster Center
July 25, 2004
At some point we may engage in a discussion about the development of a risk/threat management policy for the United States and the world.
We did not have a risk/threat management policy to deal with the threat of terrorism prior to 9-11-01. We do not have one now.
When such a policy is in place the commission advises us that we, "need to be able to measure success." Yet, the report also suggests that, "These measures need not be quantitative:" The report continues, "Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy." It concludes this paragraph with, "The American people are thus given the picture of an omnipotent, unslayable hydra of destruction. This image lowers expectations for government effectiveness."
We do need to be able to measure success. Such a measure does need to be quantifiable. The risk/threat management process is about quantifying risk/threat and making determinations based upon the cost of proposed measures, the level of risk reduction, and an understanding of the measure of the residual risk/threat factor (the risk/threat that remains).
The expectations of the American people have been and are a measurable factor in our national politics. Prior to 9-11-01, for years Al Queda had established a pattern of attacking the United States every 18 to 24 months. After 9-11-01 the pattern had been broken up by our invasion of Afghanistan. Assets and potential assets that the organization had in the United States were rounded up. Many hundreds of people who were arrested and held without access to lawyers or the courts and were expelled, none of whom were demonstrated to have a link with Al Queda. Those who have been arrested and prosecuted, were charged with inflated crimes. Many have plead guilty to significantly lower crimes to reduce the potential penalty of the charged crimes.
Given the pattern of its previous attacks and the assets known to have engaged in those action, the probability that Al Queda was prepared to deliver an attack following 9-11-01 was very small. Since 9-11-01 the Federal government has collected a great deal of information about the terrorist network. The risk that we now confront is less from Al Queda than it is from other groups who would undertake actions in sympathy with its goals and in opposition to the actions of the present administration.
Collectively and individually we live in a risk/threat universe. Every day, from the time we get up in the morning, till the time we go to bed at night, each of us make thousands of risk/threat management determinations. We face many problems that are statistically a far greater risk/threat to us than the threat of terrorism.
The commission would see us develop a response to the threat of terrorism that would make terrorism the preeminent aspect of our national policy. If we were to live our lives focused on the risk/threats of terrorism, the story of our lives could be betrayed as comedy, but the living of it a tragedy.
Risk/threat management is a science, but so far it has not been applied to the problems of the human race as a whole. The commission rightly points out that risk/threat management must guide our policy making process in the years ahead, but not does address the fact that it did not guide our policy making prior to 9-11-01.
Historically, the risk/threat management process has been applied piecemeal, in response to specific disastrous events.
The failure to develop anti-terrorism policies using risk/threat management techniques prior to 9-11-01 was this nations greatest error. If we were to address the problem of why 9-11-01 happened from the perspective of what our risk/threat management policy would have been, if we had used these techniques prior to 9-11-01, the difference could be ascribed to politics. If the commission had engaged in this process, we could begin a real discussion about how and why on 9-11-01 our government failed to protect us.
Such a discussion would involve a full and frank disclosure about how those policies were developed by the Executive and Legislative branches prior to 9-11-01. This would result in an understanding of the underlying problem and it would expose the real institutional failings in our system of government. It would answer the question that was asked by the loved ones of those who died about how and why 9-11-01 could happen. While the commission recognizes that there are systemic problems with our government’s mode of operation it does not address the root of the systemic problem that enabled 9-11-01 to take place.
We do need to develop a terrorism risk/threat management policy. Yet, that policy should embrace not just terrorism policy. We need to develop a global risk/threat management policy to promote, monitor, and assist international, regional and national organizations’ capacity to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate disasters. We nee to assist in the development of risk/threat management strategies seeking to reduce or eliminate the risk/threat of natural, technical and human caused disasters.
The mandate for this policy should originate in the United Nations. Where a specialized agency should be established, subject to the general review of the UN General Assembly and of the Economic and Social Council.
The commission is right to point out that the economic and social conditions that make life appear to be hopeless, to so many around the world, is one of the underlying causes of terrorism. Hopefully, we the people of this world will be able to occupy the globe for a long time. If we are to do so we need to now begin working towards mitigating the disasters that make that life less than it need be, so that it will be more of what it can be, for ourselves, each other, and our common posterity
A key to the long-term security and prosperity of the human race is in the development and effective implementation of disaster mitigation and risk/threat management strategies. We need to begin with disaster mitigation and work towards the goal of achieving sustainable development.
This agency shall seek to reduce or eliminate the risk/threat of disasters by fostering cost effective and efficient disaster resistant development.
Working with existing agencies the agency it would seek to:
The key to reducing the threat of terrorism is in the development of sound economic and social policies.
This document is located at:
http://www.disastercenter.com/911_2.htm
Commentaries On The 9/11 Commission Report
For Those Who Loved
Them
Risk/Threat Management
The Terrorism
Center
Deep
Institutional Failings
WMD -- Weapons of Mass
Destruction
The
911 Commission Report and the Markle Foundation's Recommendations
An Example of Data Matching
The Accuracy of Data Matching
What the United States Stands For
The 911
ReportThe complete Commision Report in PDF format (7.4
MB)
Christopher Effgen [send him an mail] is the owner of the Disaster Center web site, and has been active in reporting about disasters by digital means since the site was established in 1996. He has authored articles dealing with wide variety of disaster related topics including risk/threat management, neural networks, the science of disaster communication, and compiled numerous disaster related statistics (many of which are hosted on this site). He is active as a participant in national and international forums promoting disaster mitigation towards the goal of sustainable development.