Commentaries On The 9/11 Commission Report
The Terrorism Center
By Christopher Effgen
The Disaster Center
July 27, 2004
The simplest theory that explains why 9-11-01 happened and also justifies the changes that the Commission is advocating is that no one in the Executive and Legislative branches is responsible. This is the underlying conclusion of the 911 report, and the cause for the commission's recommendations that changes need to be made in how the Executive and Legislative Branches are structured. Before going an further it would be appropriate to point out that, if this is the case, the people have the constitutional means to remedy the defect.
At time of the 9-11-01 attacks only one terrorist group had the desire and capacity to carry out a significant attack against major US interests. This group, al Queda, undertook attacks against US interests almost like clocks work every 18 or 24 months. Operating out of a remote area of eastern Afghanistan Al Queda had declared war against the American people three years before the terrorist attacks of 9-11-01.
Since the attacks of 9-11-01 this has changed, as a result of our invasion of Afghanistan. Al Queda now represents a significantly reduced threat. Yet, our unilateral invasion of Iraq has created new threat source of terroism that is larger and diffuse.
We can not know if the administration’s Iraq policy will work out for us over the long run. Responsibility for determining if our Iraq policy will be successful has passed out of our hands and into the hands of Iraq’s, whom the Iraqi people did not elect.
The conditions of people living in this geographical area are not improving. We have no direct control over the possible outcome of a conflict that we began unilaterally. Before 9-11-01 the government and people of the United States, were admired by the majority of the people around the world. Shortly after 9-11-01 people from around the world joined us in our grief and held together with all Americans in sympathy of, for, and with the families of those who lost their lives. Now, the majority of people around the world have contempt, even hatred, for our government.
The Commission may be right, we may now need to engage in a major re-shifting and reorganization of our laws, the Executive, and Legislative branches to deal with a threat of terrorism. Yet, perhaps we do not.
There is a need for someone to be responsible for coordinating the terrorism strategy of the Executive branch. During the administration of President Clinton that individual was the President, who was assisted by Richard Clarke and other staff. At the transition between administrations, Mr. Clarke’s position in the White House hierarchy was downgraded. It seems that Mr. Clarke and others like him within the bureaucracy upset important people with their constant harping about the threat of terrorism from Osama Bin Laden. Many of these individuals quit their jobs or were forced to resign prior to 9-11-01. This was one of the institutional problems that the Commission fails to address.
The approach of the Commission to the threat of terrorism derives in part from its fear of dealing with an issue involving systemic failures in our system of government and the result of its mistaken belief that terrorism is THE threat of twenty-first century. Terrorism is a threat, one of many. It may become the dominant threat the of twenty-first century, but if this is the case it may be that the conduct of our national policy caused it to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
It is unfortunate that the 911 Commission was so focused on the the threat of terrorism that it seems to have forgoten that the founders warned us, that such a threat could be used as a justification for government taking powers destructive of our freedoms and liberty. The proposal of the Commission fits this perimeter.
The Commission recommends that significant changes be undertaken in the organization of the Executive Branch. These steps involve:
The basis for these recommendations is that no one in the Executive branch occupies a position in which to direct the agencies to cooperate, or is responsible for the coordination of different agencies’ policies. Since 9-11-01, the agencies and staffs, dealing with the single threat source of terrorism, have multiplied. The result is, according to the Commission, chaos: a multiplicity of analytical efforts, confusion in operational authority, the use of dubious intelligence, a waste of resources, and an inability to see the larger picture.
Analytical resources and operational authority reside in various Departments whose personnel and assets need to undertake the diverse tasks necessary to conduct a national government. The Secretaries of Departments should be reluctant to hand over their analytical resources and operational powers to the control of another agency, for actions that can conflict with the department’s other goals, policies, and agendas, and which would involve or impinge upon the Secretary’s legal and moral responsibility. Congress likewize should be reluctant to handover its oversight responsibilities.
The Commission’s proposes that the analytical and operational authority, to fight the war on terrorism, needs to be unified in a single agency. This proposal if carried into effect would create the danger of a single agency operating with no effective checks or balances for its analytical conclusions or the operations that it carries out. Any representative of the people who opposed its conclusions would do so at the peril of his or her political life.
I would propose an alternative, which would involve the creation of an independent agency, that would act as a center for the coordination of analytical efforts and for the formulation of operational plans. It should not be a permanant agency. We should ever keep before us the hope that the war against terrorism can some day be won, not just for Americans, but for people everywhere. This agency would operate independently, report directly to the President and be available to testify before congressional committees. The agency would operate as a kind of Terrorism Coordination Center. As such, the existing institutional structure of our government and the wisdom under which the laws of the United States were established would be preserved. The agency would be able to provide independent advice to the President and his or her Secretaries, and serve as a means for the removal of structural barriers for passage of information between the departments for the purpose of conducting of the fight against terrorism.
Information from all branches of government could be made accessible to this agency with minimal changes in our privacy laws and with effective and meaningful limits developed to reduce the likelihood that the information accessed would be abused or used for other and improper purposes. A Terrorism Coordination Center would have the capacity to be responsive to the existing structure of government, to advice and be available to consult with Congress regarding the agency’s priorities and to monitor the implementation of them. It would have the capacity to make recommendations for the covert and overt actions to the President, but it should not have the authority to carry out these actions. It would provide for a continuity of policy.
Working with existing agencies the agency would seek to:
Of course, it is neither my responsibility nor was it the commissions mandate to tell the President or congress how the government should be organized.
This document is located at:
http://www.disastercenter.com/911_3.htm
Commentaries On The 9/11 Commission Report
For Those Who Loved
Them
Risk/Threat Management
The Terrorism
Center
Deep
Institutional Failings
WMD -- Weapons of Mass
Destruction
The
911 Commission Report and the Markle Foundation's Recommendations
An Example of Data Matching
The Accuracy of Data Matching
What the United States Stands For
The 911
ReportThe complete Commision Report in PDF format (7.4
MB)
Christopher Effgen [send him an mail] is the owner of the Disaster Center web site, and has been active in reporting about disasters by digital means since the site was established in 1996. He has authored articles dealing with wide variety of disaster related topics including risk/threat management, neural networks, the science of disaster communication, and compiled numerous disaster related statistics (many of which are hosted on this site). He is active as a participant in national and international forums promoting disaster mitigation towards the goal of sustainable development.